ABSTRACT
The complicated set of actors, institutions, and powers we have reviewed in Part 2 are, between them, responsible for developing top-level policies and coordinating them into some kind of coherent ‘government’ policy. This process is still described as ‘cabinet government’. As we have seen, it is a misleading label which conceals current mechanisms under a comfort blanket, conveying the obsolete idea of collective decision-making and responsibility. The idea that we now live under ‘Prime Ministerial government’ is more accurate, but too simplistic. Government in Britain is a shifting set of ‘private empires’ which may very well be in conflict with each other (Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995: introduction). No one actor or institution dominates the whole panorama of modern government, and what actually constitutes ‘government’ varies from policy area to policy area. A Prime Minister, or Home Secretary, or mandarin, can often take or determine a decision alone, but no one actor or institution can count on determining every significant decision. Even a Prime Minister depends on other actors and institutions most of the time, and can be prevented from doing what he or she wants; or forced to do what he or she does not want to do; or be overthrown. The powers of government departments and individual ministers to make policy are strong, and yet not always recognised, and organised interests exercise considerable influence over government decision-making. We
have used the neutral term ‘core executive’ to designate the mesh of actors and institutions which, with the Prime Minister, cabinet and senior civil service at thecentre, governs this country, but the term hardly conveys the nature of the sinuous Hydra of modern government in Britain.
