chapter  12
Against the Closest Continuer Theory
Pages 18

It is now time to pull together the threads of the discussion. The theory of personal identity I favour is a version of the Complex View, and it is a version of the Complex View according to which what is crucial for personal identity is neither identity of body nor brain, but psychological continuity, in the wide sense which includes other continuities as well as continuities of memory. Where I disagree with such psychological continuity theorists as Shoemaker and Parfit is in my adherence to the Only x and y principle, and my consequent rejection of any ‘best’ or ‘no rival candidate’ version of a psychological continuity account of personal identity. The crucial difference is that I am committed to saying that any sufficiently strong line of psychological continuity represents the history of some person irrespective of what fissions or fusions have taken place, or will take place.