ABSTRACT
Intraparty disharmony and conflicts are often thought inimical to the effectiveness of parties in coalition bargaining. Consensus within the party is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of parties entering into conflict-inducing coalition negotiations. This view has commanded many distinguished advocates among political scientists. None of them, however, offered the slightest sustenance for the theory that under some circumstances what looks like intraparty consensus is incompatible with a party’s effectiveness in coalition bargaining. Indeed, in the previous chapters we observed that there are many parties whose coalition strategies-formulated on the basis of the consensual principle of democratic centralismare easily disturbed by internal conflicts, forcing them to modify their coalition strategies. But, at the same time, there are many parties that maintain their coalition strategies under conditions of intense internal conflicts. Our inquiry into the internal dynamics of party politics has, thus, pinpointed the unique character of decentralised parties and their ability to diffuse internal dissatisfaction. This thread now draws us deep into the bargaining arena. Our focus is now shifting towards the consequence of the successful and unsuccessful resolution of internal conflicts in terms of parties’ bargaining power.
