ABSTRACT
In the face of China's seemingly inexorable rise, how fearful should states on China's periphery be? Policy-makers seeking guidance from the academic literature are confronted by starkly contrasting answers to this question (Ross and Zhu 2008; Sutter 2005; Goldstein 2005; Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Womack 2003; Shirk 2007; Deng 2008). An articulate perspective contends that, notwithstanding a myriad pessimistic predictions, China's rise over the past 20 years has been largely peaceful, and will likely continue along this trajectory. 1 Accordingly, it has been argued that Asian states have little, if anything, to fear from China's rise (Kang 2007). This “peaceful rise” view of regional reactions to China's rise has been particularly evident since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8. In contrast, an alternative perspective contends that while China's rise has hitherto been peaceful, there are strong theoretical and historical reasons to doubt that this state of affairs will continue (Mearsheimer 2006; Layne 2008). Here, the recent past is not seen as a reliable indicator of future trends, and it is argued that China's rise will be characterized by high levels of conflict. According to this “conflictual rise” view, Asian states have much to fear about China's rise.
