ABSTRACT
In previous chapters we have examined cloning from the perspective of human rights and dignity and have looked at the extent to which the idea of procreative liberty can inform reproductive choices, which might use cloning. We then examined the weight, which should be given to concern for the welfare of children that might be born as a result of cloning technology. In this chapter we look at a plethora of disparate arguments that, born of a desperation to find something (one may reasonably think desperation to find almost anything) that can be said against cloning, have entered the public debate. They are a testament to the perseverance and ingenuity, which can be deployed in defence of antipathy to cloning. At the end of this chapter we will look again at the one remotely plausible argument that has been levelled against human reproductive cloning, the idea that because it is untested and possibly unsafe, it should not for the moment be permitted.
