ABSTRACT
The notion of the self has an important place in Hegel’s philosophy. Two of the reasons for this apply with equal force to a good many other philosophers. If, firstly, we are concerned to give an account of the world, the self is a puzzling entity which it is difficult to accomodate in a coherent way. Secondly, Hegel is troubled by problems of an egocentric kind, such as ‘Can I know what the world is really like?’1 and ‘Why should I not just do whatever I want to do?’2-problems whose solution requires an account of the self to which they essentially refer. The third reason is one that Hegel shares with few other thinkers. It is that the human mind, rather than the machine or the living organism, provides him with a model for understanding the universe as a whole. How literally this is to be taken is a controversial matter, which will be considered later.3 This chapter will be concerned only with the first of these issues, namely the nature of the self, and that particularly in relation to thoughts and thinking.
