ABSTRACT

The basic building block of social theory is practical inference, the logical relation we consciously refer to for understanding, explaining, and predicting human action. Aristotle introduced practical inference as a way of linking the good or desirable to the action that was good, right. Recent thought treats it as the appropriate form of reasoning from means to ends, goals.1 Ends are broadly characterized by values, which must be, to put it at its lowest, one of the variables upon which the desiredness or goodness of ends depends. The notion that actions-or, more precisely, choices among feasible actions-are purposive is implicit in such reasoning, as is the possibility of using its premises, if sufficiently specified, for telling whether an action that applied some means to some end was rationally chosen or not, or how strong, how demanding a criterion of rationality it satisfied. Significantly, Anscombe (Anscombe, 1957) regards calculation as an integral element of practical reasoning. It would help clarify further thought if “choosing” an alternative were distinguished from the mere “taking” of it-a distinction that depends on the element of calculation and that revealed preference and empiricism do not find congenial.