ABSTRACT
In changing course and allies and in fighting elections, to the Reichstag in 1878 and to the Prussian Landtag in 1879, Bismarck had not only used his myth, but also what appeared to be his standing as the arbiter of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. It was less obvious to the public that the aftermath of the congress had left Bismarck’s foreign policy dangerously exposed. Mutual suspicion between Berlin and St Petersburg, evident since at least the ‘war in sight’ crisis, had multiplied. The Russians blamed Bismarck for the setback that they had suffered at the congress; there were renewed efforts to strengthen Russia’s relations with France and Russian troop concentrations on the Polish border with Germany. The Russians were also annoyed by the new German tariff policy, which might restrict their agricultural exports to the German market. German veterinary regulations, which impeded the import of cattle even more than the tariffs, were another Russian grievance. There were other pinpricks that the Russians could interpret as provocations. Under a clause in the treaty of Prague of 1866 Prussia agreed to hold a plebiscite in the areas of North Schleswig inhabited by a large number of Danes. Russia attached importance to this clause, because of her dynastic ties to and strategic interest in Denmark. Bismarck chose this moment to make public the fact that Austria had agreed to this clause being dropped. Alarm bells began to ring when on 15 August 1879 William received a letter of complaint from his nephew the tsar, which in spite of professions of friendship and familial devotion, was judged to have a threatening undertone. It became known as ‘the box on the ear’ letter.
