ABSTRACT
The SEM project unleashed a fresh wave of ‘low politics’ integration in the form of harmonisation of national standards and regulations, and the abolition of non-tariff barriers. The dynamic for European integration was further maintained by the combined impact of the Commission and the advocacy coalition in favour of EMU. In keeping with the neo-functionalist concept of ‘spillover’, the Commission argued that EMU was a necessary corollary of the SEM. In June 1988, the Commission president, Jacques Delors, secured the European Council’s support for his proposal to establish a high-level working party (chaired by himself and largely composed of the governors of member states’ banks), to draw up proposals for achieving EMU. In 1989, the committee recommended the gradual establishment of a single currency and an IGC was convened to consider the Treaty amendments required in order to establish the EMU. This pragmatic integration strategy was, however, suddenly blown off course by international events. The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union after 1989 and consequent unification of Germany in 1991 thrust upon the Community member states a much wider policy agenda. First, just as in 1945, France was again anxious to anchor a powerful Germany into the Community system. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, was also anxious to demonstrate Germany’s continuing commitment to European integration. Crucially, these objectives reinforced both countries’ commitment to further deepening of the EU, and more specifically, to the realisation of EMU. Second, the disintegration of the Soviet system created new uncertainties about the future development of Western security. Doubts regarding the future European role of NATO gave further impetus to those member states, such as France, who wished to see a more powerful role for the WEU and the development of a common European security policy. Third, Eastern enlargement of the Community-and the financial and institutional implications of such a development-was also now an unavoidable issue. At the suggestion of the French President, François Mitterrand, and of Helmut Kohl, the European Council in June 1990 agreed to set up a second IGC on European political union. The outcome of the two IGCs was the TEU, adopted at the Maastricht meeting of the European Council in December 1991.
