ABSTRACT

As argued by intergovernmentalist models of integration, national interests and national governments have undoubtedly played a crucial role in determining the degree and pace of European integration. This dynamic is particularly apparent with regard to ‘historymaking’ decisions (Peterson 1995) such as the initial establishment of the European Communities (Stirk and Weigall 1999; Milward 1992), subsequent renegotiation of the Treaties (Moravcsik 1991; 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1998) and the creation of European Monetary Union (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). In this context, interstate bargains conducted by national political leaders and administrative elites have been a very visible dynamic of integration. The EU policy preferences of national governments are informed in part by political ideology and ‘core beliefs’ (Sabatier 1988)—not least with regard to the principle of European integration. In consequence, the changing composition and ideological character of member governments have also played a role in determining the pace and direction of European integration. However, to confine our explanation of European integration to the motivations and actions of national governments would be to study only the tip of the iceberg. In addition, we need to evaluate the often less visible, but no less important role played by other actors and institutions involved in this process, broadly defined.