ABSTRACT
The EU is a supranational construction that is demanding both in descriptive and normative terms.1 It is a complex network of institutions for regulating common affairs, but it is not unitary and self-contained as a political unit. Even if its institutional structuring resembles a separation of powers, akin to the separation of power in a nation-state, there are profound differences. The Council of the Union consists of representatives from the Member States, and legislates on behalf of the Union. It decides some matters by qualified majority but most by unanimity. The European Parliament which is directly elected by the peoples of the Member States, have not until recently had much legislative power. Nor has it had much authority to hold the executive accountable. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) increased its role. The European Commission is the executor of Union policies and is endowed with the right of initiative, which includes the right to issue legislative proposals. In addition, hundreds of Committees, which were originally constructed to control delegation of powers from the Council to the Commission, are in operation. Such a system may blur the constitutional distinction between legislative and executive powers, between politics and administration. However, it may also represent a new emergent regime of governance contributing to deliberative supranationalism, as the authors of Chapter 8 in this volume contend.
