ABSTRACT
American debates over NATO and EU enlargement have been lopsided. The initial debate over EU enlargement only emerged insofar as it related to NATO enlargement. The Clinton administration generally established ad hoc linkages between the two, but a consensus eventually emerged within the administration and Congress that NATO enlargement should precede EU enlargement owing to the stabilising function of NATO, the inherent difficulty of EU enlargement itself, and a belated unwillingness to cede the initiative in reshaping the European security space to the EU. The Clinton administration and influential members of Congress only became wary of the diplomatic and military-strategic consequences of EU enlargement as the NATO ratification process drew to a close. This response raises the question posed in the title of this chapter: was American policy towards the two enlargements informed by a compelling strategic vision or was it simply the sum of unconnected tactical posturings? In this chapter I address this question, the answer to which is central to an understanding of the enlargement debates within the United States and also provides insights into the expectations placed on Europe in the post-Cold War security order.
