The Baltic states

The three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) feel particularly vulnerable as very small, newly independent states with extremely limited military resources located in close proximity to Russia, which has historically regarded them as integral parts of her empire. The presence of large Russian-speaking minorities in both Latvia and Estonia and the sensitive issue of transit rights from the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad across Lithuania inevitably mean that Russia continues to regard the Baltic states as a legitimate sphere of special interest. Although there is no reason to fear that the present Russian government has any plans to try to reincorporate the Baltic states into a ‘greater Russia’, there have been periodic warnings that it would be prepared if necessary to defend its interests in the region, and in the Duma and mass media the use of force has been raised as an option.1 On the basis of any realistic assessment of even the collective capabilities of the Baltic states, they would be unable to defend themselves effectively2 and so from the very beginning they have regarded NATO and EU membership as the only viable guarantee of their independence. Their security strategy has therefore been to attain full membership of both the EU and NATO as soon as possible and their domestic and foreign policies since their independence in 1991 have been centred on these overriding goals. Russia’s reaction has been to differentiate sharply between EU and NATO enlargement to the Baltics, with acquiescence bordering on positive support for the former and implacable opposition to the latter. Although both organisations vigorously deny any suggestion that Russia should influence their membership policies, it does now seem almost certain that all three Baltic states will join the EU within the next five years, whereas there is uncertainty still about their prospects of attaining NATO membership. Indeed, it seems to be hoped in some circles at least that the ‘soft security’ offered by the EU may suffice and the Baltic states might be persuaded to accept a similar security status to Finland and Sweden, and thus avoid upsetting the regional balance of power and alienating Russia.