ABSTRACT
Introduction Since interpretations of Hume as some kind of causal realist were put forward by Galen Strawson (1989) and by John Wright (1983) there has been much discussion about how to interpret passages in Hume’s writings especially in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) in which he refers to causal powers in objects. The accounts of Hume’s alleged realism given by Strawson and Wright differ. I argue here that neither version fits Hume’s thought. In §1 I summarize the features of Strawson’s version that I need for my argument, and in §2 I argue that there is conflict between this kind of causal realism and Hume’s inductive scepticism. To ascribe to Hume causal realism as Strawson understands it is to blunt the power of Hume’s argument for inductive scepticism.
