ABSTRACT
According to the causal model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is simply to give information about its causal history (Lewis 1986) or, where the phenomenon is itself a causal regularity, to explain it is to give information about the mechanism linking cause and effect. If we explain why smoking causes cancer, we do not give a cause of this causal connection, but we do give information about the causal mechanism that makes it. Not only is the causal model of explanation natural and plausible, but it avoids many of the problems that beset the other views we have canvassed. It provides a clear distinction between understanding why a phenomenon occurs and merely knowing that it does, since it is possible to know that a phenomenon occurs without knowing what caused it. Moreover, the model draws this distinction in a way that makes understanding unmysterious and objective. Understanding is not some sort of superknowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes.
