ABSTRACT
The common assumption in analytic discussions of aggression is that the affective states commonly associated with aggressive action —anger, rage, hatred, irritation, etc.—are synonymous with aggression and are counted as expressions or manifestations of the aggressive drive. In this chapter we focus on these affects and draw a clear distinction between aggression as motive and these affective resonances. We recognize that analytic thinking about affects is currently in a state of considerable flux and diversity, and consequently do not intend to present a theory about the nature of affects. Affects are one of the most difficult and confusing subjects in psychoanalysis. No past or present-day psychoanalytic theory is comprehensive enough to provide full understanding of subjectively experienced affects. In fact, psychoanalysis cannot of itself produce an all-encompassing theory of affect. The neurological, chemical (neurotransmitters), and hormonal conditioners and determinants of affects lie beyond or outside of the scope of analytic theory. Much has been learned about the psychology and neurobiology of emotions (Damasio, 1994, 1999) and significant challenges lie ahead for integrating such rapidly advancing neuroscientific findings with psychoanalytic phenomenology and theoretical understanding. The unique and exclusive contribution of psychoanalysis to the understanding affect consists in its ability to trace the intrapsychic conscious and unconscious processes (perceptions, memories, memory traces, wishes, desires, and defenses) that contribute to the establishment of unconscious affects and the experience of conscious feelings. Many psychoanalytic theories about affect have emerged in recent
decades, but, in the end, when it comes to the technical analysis of the emergence of affect in the clinical situation, we still find ourselves relying on Freud’s understanding of the dynamic organization structuring affective experience (Green, 1999).
