ABSTRACT
Before starting with the settlement of the conceptual framework for analyzing negotiations in the EU, it is necessary to make a few introductory remarks on its status. A theoretical framework must be specific enough to offer guidance in the field analyzed, yet general enough to permit application to widely variable situations. The idea behind this is to try to create a framework enabling the analysis of the internal negotiations between the Council of the EU and the European Commission. The purpose of this dissertation is not to create an operational bargaining theory to help to understand the specific outcome of any negotiation, but rather to analyze how negotiations take place under those policy fields falling under the competence of the EC, the so-called first pillar1 of the EU, and also falling under the consultation procedure2. Thus, the role played by the European Parliament (EP) will not be taken into account, as the EP only delivers an opinion to the Council of the EU. The power of the EP to influence legislative proposals varies according to the legal basis within the Treaty of Rome. Most fisheries proposals concerning internal fisheries have, as their legal basis, Article 37 of the Treaty establishing EC, which simply requires the EP to be consulted.3 Although there are several studies available focusing on the EP (see, for example, Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), including this institution in the present analysis would not contribute to a better understanding of the bargaining outcomes and would only make the analysis more complex.
