ABSTRACT
The primary aim of this dissertation project was to comprehend how negotiations in the EU work theoretically and empirically and to do this a conceptual framework for analyzing internal negotiations was developed and applied to two key negotiations in the settlement of the CFP, which at the same time illustrate how integrative and distributive bargaining takes place in the EU. It was argued that preferences of member states are an important variable when assessing EU negotiations. However, taking preferences seriously is not the whole story of bargaining in the EU. In order to be able to explain bargaining outcomes, not only the preferences of member states, but also the preferences of the European Commission and the institutional setting have to be taken into account. This work attempted to analyze negotiations in the course of the European integration process by linking theories to reality. An analytical framework based on the tradition of rational-choice was used and state-centric approaches were linked to new institutionalist and public choice approaches. The focus was placed on explaining EU negotiations and bargaining strategies specifying who were the actors at the negotiating table, which preferences they had, and how far the institutional setting and the preferences of the Commission influenced bargaining outcomes. It was shown that for explaining bargaining outcomes in the EU, not only the preferences of the member states, but also the preferences of the Commission and the institutional setting played a decisive role. In the two analyzed bargaining situations it was demonstrated how these variables affected the bargaining outcomes. Three findings come out: preferences of member states matter, the preferences of the European Commission matter, and the institutional setting matters.
