Introduction

The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states’ preferences and institutions. This work is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It elaborates on the gap between theoretical and empirical studies. For this a conceptual framework for analyzing negotiations in the European Union (EU)1 will be juxtaposed to the key negotiations leading to the establishment of the Common Fisheries Policy (hereinafter referred to as CFP). It is a stock phrase that national governments’ preferences matter in the EU, but what is less precisely known is whether national preferences are really central in the negotiation process or only one variable among many others. Nevertheless, “taking preferences seriously” (Moravcsik 1997a) is not the whole story of bargaining in the EU. In the end member states make the ultimate decisions, but they do not fully control the negotiation process. Member states are constrained by the preferences of the European Commission2, considered to be an actor in its own right, and also by the institutional setting, which includes the variables limiting the range of feasible alternative actions available to an actor. In this thesis, institutional setting refers to the formal (voting or decision rules) and informal rules (iterated or repeated bargaining) of a bargaining game, which defines a particular negotiating situation in which n individuals (known as players) participate. This definition of the institutional setting is also in line with the traditional new institutionalist literature, which defines institutions as the formal and informal rules, such as procedures, codes of conduct, etc. (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938; March and Olsen 1989, 21).