Over the past two decades, there has been an unparalleled interest in the question of the analyst’s subjectivity. All around us-at meetings, in the hallways and corridors of our institutes, in curbside discussions and more formal presentations-analysts have been debating the validity and implications of an increasingly prevalent view of the analytic situation. Simply put, it is this: that analysis is an undertaking that inevitably involves two people; two minds, two hearts, two life histories in dynamic interaction; and that unconscious communications transmitted from both participants, and not solely those arising from the inner world of the patient, contribute in signifi cant ways to the analytic process. And everywhere these days we encounter language that seeks to describe one or another aspect of the interplay between patient and analyst: enactments, intersubjectivity, social constructionism, the analytic dyad, the interactive matrix, and so on. Clearly subjectivity is a topic whose time has come. So ubiquitous a presence has it been in our fi eld, however, and so preoccupied has our literature been with it, that one can understand the wish, expressed by a number of colleagues, that it were a topic whose time had come-and gone.