ABSTRACT
THE SUDDEN and dramatic changes in leadership in Britain and the United States in the later part of 1963 caused a major change in the West’s relationship with Nasser. Alec Douglas-Home had been Foreign Secretary for just over three years before attaining the premiership. He was a cold warrior suspicious of the Russians and Nasser alike. As Commonwealth Secretary, he was in the ‘inner councils’ during Suez from the opening of the crisis to the fall of Eden and remained a firm supporter of the operation.1 A virtual stranger to domestic and economic matters, he put forward, as his main political virtue, a willingness to protect Britain’s interests abroad. During his time as Foreign Secretary, AngloEgyptian relations had for the most part been cool if in the main correct. Home was, as we have seen, suspicious of some of the initiatives put forward by his civil servants to improve Anglo-Egyptian relations. Initially during the Yemen War, he had counselled moderation in British policy but his minutes and comments on Foreign Office memorandums suggest that his position was hardening against Nasser as 1963 wore on.
