ABSTRACT
In recent years, a spate of transport accidents affecting UK citizens has led some jurists and other contributors to the debate to argue for changes in the legal system. They argue that it should be made easier to bring corporate manslaughter charges against those responsible for designing and directing organizational systems that are judged inherently unsafe, instead of focusing blame narrowly on an individual-for example, a driver or a pilot-who is not responsible for the broader corporate policies that create the setting for major system failures (cf. Field & Jorg 1991, Wells 1988,1991,1992). The sinking of the car ferry Herald of Free Enterprise at Zeebrugge in 1987 led to a corporate manslaughter suit against P&o Ferries being brought to court in 1990, partly as a result of pressure-group activity. Although that particular case collapsed, it may well be that further corporate manslaughter suits will emerge in the future, and such developments may significantly affect the incentive structure of senior corporate executives in relation to risk management.
