ABSTRACT
In the previous chapter we argued that the future of Post Keynesian economics rests in an extended dialogue with those that appear to employ similar methodological precepts. In Chapter 6 we highlighted how the distinctive Post Keynesian view of time, which is embedded in its methodology, can be marshalled to underscore and clarify the distinction between bounded rationality and fundamental uncertainty. Here we attempt to develop this line of argument by further developing in detail the arguments and implications of the last few chapters, and by exploring and clarifying some of the important synergies and differences with the Austrian school. As we have argued in Chapter 7 there are indeed substantial gains from trade to be had if both Austrians and Post Keynesians communicated on a range of issues such as methodology, praxeology, dispersed knowledge, learning, entrepreneurship, speculation, price theory, market process, uncertainty, co-ordination, effective demand, money – its evolution and its endogeneity – and the importance of power (Lawson, 1994a; O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1995; cf. Kregel, 1986; Bellante, 1992). However, if Post Keynesians are to engage with the Austrians more seriously than they have done in the past, the fundamental stumbling block of the (implicit) omniscience ascribed to the market process must be broached. That is to say, one of the key differences between Austrians and Post Keynesians centres on their questions of differences in methodology and in the recognition of the salience of ‘fundamental’ uncertainty! This chapter seeks to further outline the methodological and axiomatic similarities of Austrian and Post Keynesian economics so as to underpin further, more enlightened, debate.
