ABSTRACT
I begin lamely – to catch the dithering of any usual effort to get one’s bearings in reading Wittgenstein profitably before any genuine clue deigns to present itself. I do finally arrive at a judgment that I find convincing and pursue it among familiar texts in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, persuaded that there cannot be any uniquely correct way to read the “later” Wittgenstein. I also acknowledge that, by favoring a non-standard reading, I have somehow made Wittgenstein out to be a more conventional philosopher than he is usually said to be. I believe he is. He is certainly no Wittgensteinian. Beyond that, I must ask you to be patient with the argument that follows. It’s peculiarly true in analyzing Wittgenstein that in order to assess the relevance of his texts for the questions that arise in the philosophy of art – and, for that matter, the philosophy of literature – we must speculate very broadly about the nature of his general “method.” That may strike you as an arid way of proceeding. I don’t believe it is. But I trust you will find that the argument gathers strength as it continually discards false leads and arrives at long last at a fairly sensible conclusion. Wittgenstein, I venture, is worth the labor.
