ABSTRACT
Attention had to be paid not only to preparing for British initiatives but also to guarding against those taken by Argentina. By Thursday 15 April the UK believed that three of the four Argentine submarines, though unlocated, had been at sea for several days, and at 1630 London time on that day Nott brought to an ad hoc group of ministers and senior officials meeting with the Prime Minister information that an Argentine submarine was probably already active in the MEZ and might shortly be relieved by another. They discussed varying the ROE for the British SSNs about to reach the area. MoD’s initial proposal was that ‘any submarine found within the MEZ should be presumed to be an Argentine submarine, and might be attacked.’ The FCO was nervous that there might be other submarines in the MEZ-perhaps Soviet (which would be nuclear) or those of other nations (Brazil and Chile were the only possible candidates, both equipped with conventional submarines). FCO’s principal motivation at this stage was to avoid the sinking of any Argentine ship while the Haig mission was still in progress, and both Pym and FCO officials were uneasy that ‘there are those in MoD who will want to bounce us into over-hasty decisions.’
