ABSTRACT
In Britain and in the South Atlantic the risks to the landing force were analysed and reanalysed. The Argentines clearly knew that a landing was likely but not exactly where or when. Success required surprise. To achieve this good intelligence was required on Argentine preparations, while the enemy remained unaware of British preparations and, preferably, was looking elsewhere when the critical moment came. Intelligence gathering had not been easy. From 9 May, Nimrods had been mounting surveillance sorties from Ascension. The demands on tankers were extensive-requiring up to 11 Victors as the sorties moved further south. Vulcan bomber attacks and Hercules airdrops competed for the same resources. It was decided that for the moment, and until after the landing, the priority was to make sure that no Argentine warships were at sea, and, if any were, that there was sufficiently timely information for the SSNs to intercept them. On 16 May Alacrity travelled Falkland Sound again and could report back that there was still no hint of mining activity
The British believed that the head of the Argentine Navy, Admiral Anaya, remained committed to defending the Falklands, regardless of the further cost in lives and equipment. The strategy appeared to be not so much one of stopping the British retaking the Islands as of imposing such costs that the Thatcher Government would fall. Rather than agree to an unsatisfactory negotiated settlement, the hawks in the Junta appeared to take the view that it was better to rely on London being unable to sustain either its military or diplomatic position over the long term. The contribution of Anaya’s own force to this objective was less sure. The Argentine Navy was hardly taking a bold posture. The three Argentine Type 42s were going to be in port for refuelling and re-provisioning in the run up to the landing, while the Southern Task Group of two older destroyers was in Ushuaia. Three frigates had been at sea for some time, and at one point were well beyond the 12-mile limit, but they had been pulled back nearer the coast where the rest of the surface fleet, including the carrier, had been operating. The cautious strategy was being followed, although the ships were being kept well supplied and could deploy quickly. The two Type 209
submarines had escaped detection so far but their impact had been limited and the threat had been downgraded. At most one submarine was on patrol. In fact the San Luis had
returned to Puerto Belgrano on 17 May and needed maintenance and repairs before she could go on patrol again; the Salta was suffering from a series of defects and was not ready to deploy; the Santiago del Estero was permanently non-operational.
