ABSTRACT
In the previous chapters we have concentrated on the various ways in which Frege, Russell, and the logical positivists attempted to systematise our intuitive notion of meaning. In this chapter we move on to look at what appears to be a much more negative outlook on meaning: scepticism. We will look at three main lines of philosophical scepticism about the notion of meaning, two of which are associated with the influential American philosopher W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000). In §4.1-4.5 we discuss Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction; in §4.5-4.10 we discuss Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation; and in the next chapter we consider Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea that the expressions of our language possess such a thing as a determinate meaning. These discussions will set the scene for Chapter 6, where we look at a number of attempts to respond to these sceptical challenges.
