ABSTRACT

However, domestic employment growth in the post 1993 period has remained dependent on Israeli closure policies. The intermittent closures imposed on the Palestinian territories since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada have led to massive layoffs and high unemployment rates (see Figure 11.2). Moreover, employment generation capacity varies between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, most of the jobs created since 1993 have been in the public sector. This sector has absorbed 25-30 per cent of the domestically employed workforce since 1995. In the West Bank, by contrast, the public sector generated only 18 percent of total employment since 1995 (MAS 2000). The productivity of these jobs remains highly questionable, in view of the drain that they represent on fiscal revenues and their concentration in the police forces.11 Meanwhile, the growth in West Bank domestic employment has not always been substantially higher than the number of jobs created in Israel (Farsakh 2002). Between 1998 and 1999 in particular, the West Bank absorbed less than 45 per cent of the increase in total employment. In the Gaza Strip, by contrast, growth of employment in the domestic economy was more important than that in Israel. The domestic market accounted for 77 per cent of all employment over this period (Farsakh 2002). The large presence of West Bank workers in Israeli establishments in the period 1997-9 (see Table 11.1), years with few closure days, reflect an increase in Israeli demand for such labour as well as relative ease of access.