ABSTRACT
In saying that there is this “utilitarian aspect” or feature to Fantideva’s morality, let me be clear that I am not saying it is equivalent to the moral theory associated with Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. As part of his case for understanding Buddhist ethics as analogous to Aristotelian virtue ethics, Damien Keown argued against the view that Buddhism could be understood as utilitarian (1992: 175-84). He pointed out that Buddhist ethics are not utilitarian in the sense that the right is not defined independently of the good, because nirvaja or awakening (bodhi) is the good and what is right is intrinsically related to it. If this can be understood to be what formally defines utilitarianism, then I agree that Buddhist ethics (at least Fantideva’s) are not utilitarian. In Keown’s view, with which I also agree, right acts are skilful (kufala),1
and are right by virtue of being skilful. Thus, I am not claiming that Fantideva’s morality is utilitarian in this formal sense. Let me also be clear that by suggesting that there is a form of utilitarian reasoning present I am not thereby offering support for the so-called “transcendency thesis,” or the idea that morality is somehow only instrumentally valuable
in Buddhism.2 As discussed in Chapter 4 (“Kufala”), Keown associates this idea with a utilitarian reading of Buddhist ethics, but by suggesting that there occurs a utilitarian-style maximizing of benefits I am in no way suggesting that ethics are transcended in the state of enlightenment, and I fully support Keown in his rejection of this idea. As I have already suggested, when we are speaking about a highly developed bodhisattva whose every act is skilful and compassionate, who has eliminated greed, hatred, and delusion, there is clearly a sense in which all of his actions are morally good. As such, morality could not be understood to have been “transcended.” However, I am suggesting that for a skilful and compassionate bodhisattva the main question would be, “What will be the best thing for other beings?” and it is then that there is a weighing of consequences in terms of the benefit for sentient beings, and an effort to maximize those benefits. Insofar as the most beneficial course of action might entail transgressing precepts and rules which are in effect guidelines for how to become skilful, this form of skilful means is an important aspect of the bodhisattva’s morality. Keown is therefore right to say that right and wrong in the Buddhist case are not determined by the consequences of actions, as in utilitarianism, but we should recognize that in the case of a bodhisattva whose motives are skilful (kufala) and whose actions are therefore all right in this sense, there will be a kind of consequentialism that is used to decide the best course of action. The notion of a “hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness” complicates things even further, since it is a concept that would influence decision-making all along the spiritual path, affecting monastics and lay people, bodhisattvas and non-bodhisattvas. And as I have argued, though the “hierarchy of karmic fruitfulness” may be explained in terms of virtues, the moral reasoning it yields has an element of utilitarianism.
