ABSTRACT
Regarded as a triumph for Chinese mediation the September 2005 agreement seemed to portend a resolution of the nuclear issue. The details of the agreement were left for later negotiations which were not held because of the American imposition of financial sanctions on the North. The North withdrew from the Six Party Talks and in the following year resorted to missile and nuclear tests to demonstrate that it had the capability to be treated seriously. The nuclear test revealed that the nuclear program was not just a bargaining chip for negotiations, but a step in the development of nuclear weapons that had been long planned. Because the North went ahead with the test despite Chinese warnings it also revealed that China’s ability and willingness to influence the North was constrained by its relationship with it. The nuclear test changed the situation in many ways as the US realized that it could not rely upon China to press the North into eliminating its nuclear program. The US agreed to conduct direct negotiations with the North in a major change of policy for the Bush Administration. The result was the downgrading of the Six Party Talks as they became less important for the negotiation of the nuclear issue.
