ABSTRACT
Thought Experiments (TEs) are reasoning processes that are based on ‘results’ of an experiment carried out in thought. What is the validity of an experiment – that has not been actually executed – for knowledge about the physical world? What are the features that make it distinctive and how do we integrate it into learning environments to support such thought processes? This study suggests that a thought experiment draws on three epistemological resources: conceptual-logical inferences, visual imagery and bodily motor experience. We start by stating how students’ TEs are related to recent research on learning science and then proceed to describe the nature of TEs. The central part of the paper deals with cognitive theories and empirical examples of visual imagery and bodily imagery. It also deals with how these enable implicit knowledge about the world to be retrieved. Students may have, but are not aware of, such knowledge for it is hidden when learning is only based on formal representations. We show that imagination is structured, goal-oriented, based on prior experiential imagery and internally coherent. Students can, for example, mentally rotate objects at constant velocity. Students can ‘zoom in and out’ to inspect imaginary situations, transfer objects, predict paths of imaginary moving objects and imagine the impact of forces on mechanical systems. We show that the TEs are powerful because of these capabilities. We further claim that these are not exploited by school learning environments and offer a first step towards understanding imagery in science learning.
