ABSTRACT
Even more significant than Japan’s unforced error in failing to destroy Oahu’s naval base was its bad luck in finding not one US aircraft carrier in port. As of Friday morning, 5 December 1941, Lexington, displacing 36,000 tons and capable of close to 34 knots, had been moored to the port side of mooring platforms F-9-N and F-9-S at Ford Island, although it then left to deliver Marine fighters to the tiny US garrison at Midway Island, 1,134 miles to the northwest. Saratoga, displacing 33,000 tons and – like Lexington – converted from a battle cruiser hull under the terms of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty, was steaming for San Diego after a refitting in Bremerton, to receive a complement of planes and pilots before returning to Hawaii. Yorktown had been shifted to Europe months before, to provide air cover for the massive Lend-Lease convoys. While as late as 28 November, Enterprise had been moored on the starboard side of Berth B-3, on the morning of 7 December it was 150-200 miles west of Oahu, returning from delivering a dozen Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters and their Marine pilots to the tiny garrison at Wake, 2,002 miles west of Pearl Harbor.1 Kimmel had ordered this mission within hours of receiving the “War Warning,” telling the squadron commander to discuss it with no one, since secret information was being passed from Hawaii to Tokyo and Japan might seize upon news of the transfer of an aerial squadron to Wake as a provocation justifying an attack.
