ABSTRACT
Nietzsche’s idea of “perspectivism” has often been equated with relativism, with the idea that there is no objective knowledge, only “knowledge” relative to a perspective; and that there is no objective truth, only “truth” relative to a perspective. Call this “Perspectivism as Protagoreanism,” since the relativism at issue echoes the famed Protagorean “man is the measure” doctrine: what is true for me, may be false for you, and vice versa. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, based on the actual texts, is not equivalent to Perspectivism as Protagoreanism, and in some ways is rather banal in the post-Quinean world. All knowing may depend on “will” or “affect,” but evolutionary pressures select in favor of some of these affects, such that most “creatures like us” converge on many epistemic values, albeit not all. Yet, beyond that baseline, the Busy World Hypothesis reminds us that the particular objects of cognition that command our attention will be influenced by our other affects and interests, and that this epistemic constitution plays an important role in what we know about the world.
