ABSTRACT
Historians of US nuclear nonproliferation policy have asserted that senior US officials and their advisers believed that nuclear proliferation could have an adverse impact on the US position in world affairs. This paper confirms that argument by systematically reviewing official thinking during the 1960s. The taxonomy of proliferation risks discussed by government officials during 1960–1967 included nuclear accidents and crises caused by the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Another perceived risk was regional conflicts involving nuclear use by nations allied with the major Cold War adversaries, which could raise the danger of general nuclear war. A central concern, however, was the damaging impact that new nuclear powers could have on US global power and influence; they might act more independently and “new centers of decision-making” could cause greater instability and unpredictability in international relations, to the detriment of the US interests. Such fears emerged during the Cold War and have persisted long after that conflict ended. As important as concerns about proliferation risks have been for US policymakers, other security interests and concerns, including domestic politics, could have greater weight.
