ABSTRACT
The US once dominated the uranium enrichment service, essential for manufacturing nuclear fuel for reactors for peaceful purposes in the Western bloc. This capability is sensitive since it could ultimately lead to the ability to produce atomic bomb. By the 1970s, however, this US enrichment monopoly collapsed. Industrialised nations such as France and the FRG not only cultivated the enrichment market but also wished to export reprocessing technologies, despite separated plutonium being used not only for civilian purposes but also for producing atomic bombs. The Nixon and Ford administrations at first tried to regain control over the enrichment market by establishing Uranium Enrichment Associates (UEA), with the wealthy candidate partners, Iran and Japan. However, these candidate countries never considered the proposal attractive because of emerging alternative enrichment suppliers. The Ford Administration also proposed tripartite reprocessing arrangements with ROK and Japan, and with Pakistan and Iran to prevent Seoul and Islamabad from solely building reprocessing plants in their territories. However, none of these countries except the US wanted multinational reprocessing arrangement and this proposal failed too. The US gradually put more emphasis on the importance of harmonious rules among the new nuclear suppliers and universally applied international norms regarding sensitive technologies.
