Bodily and External Goods in Relation to Happiness

The division of good things into those belonging to the soul, those belonging to the body and external ones is at least as old as Plato, who says in the Laws (3.697a–b): “it is right that the goods of the soul should be highest in honour and come first, provided that the soul possesses temperance; second come the good and fair things of the body; and third the so-called (legomena) goods of property and money.” ¹ As Inwood (2014b, 255) points out, Plato recognised in this division “a common-sense starting point for substantial ethical theorising,” and Aristotle too made use of the classification as a point of received wisdom, an endoxon: “given that the goods have been divided into three, and some are said to be external, others to relate to the soul and body respectively” (EN 1.8.1098b12–15; cf. Pol. 7.1.1323a24–27). But this tripartition never played a central role in the ethical philosophy of either of the two fourth-century pioneers. ² By contrast, it was formalised and became, according to our sources, a central point of contention in the Hellenistic debate between Stoics and Peripatetics over 206the pursuit of happiness. ³ The controversy over whether all three types are indeed goods and contribute to happiness is given great prominence by Cicero, especially in Tusculans 5 and On Ends 3–5, which expound the ‘tremendous clash’ between Stoics and Peripatetics on this very issue:

There is a dispute between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. The Stoics argue that there is nothing good except what is moral, the Peripatetics claim that there are certain bodily and external goods as well, even while attributing far and away the greatest value to morality. Here we have a truly honourable contest, a tremendous clash.

(Cic. Fin. 2.68; transl. Woolf)