ABSTRACT
Changes that occur in Russia have certain limits that correlate with attitudes of the population and elite towards new values and their willingness to follow the process of reform. First of all this relates to elites. Implementation of any policies (not to mention institutions) by the central elite is defined by institutional contexts, interests, actors’ capabilities and so on (see Calista, 1994). There is a ‘breaking point’ of any political system connected with the strength of opposition and counteraction. That is why the Kremlin leadership needs political backing. The problem of elite (dis)unity and consensus on basic values is closely connected in this way with the problem of regime stability, reform realization and leading group survival. Support by the population at large and that of the elite for democratic institutions and market economy is a current area of research interest. Studies undertaken in recent years have enabled us to say with confidence that contemporary reforms in Russia have been losing the support of the majority of the population (Burmykina and Nechaeva, 1998; Kapustin and Klyamkin, 1994; Maiminas, 1996; Safronov et al., 1999; Whitefield and Evans, 1994). This is partly due to the fact that neither liberal nor democratic ideas have had deep foundations in traditional Russian culture (Bahry, 1993). In spite of this, mass and elite surveys in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania conducted in 1992 and 1995 have shown quite a high orientation towards democracy and market economy among national elites (Miller et al., 1995, 1997; Miller et al., 1998; see also Golovachev and Kosova, 1995).
