that"

This is really tantamount to brushing away the whole distinction, and yet there is no denying that such a word as hardne.'!Js is on a. different plane altogether from stone, etc. I think Dr. Keynes's result has been arrived at on account of the unhappy term " abstract" and especially of its contrast "concrete," because these words in ordinary language are often applied to differences which have no connexion with the distinction occupying us here. This is seen with particular clearness in V. Dahlerup's article " Abstrakter og konkreter" (Dania 10. 65 ff.), in which he says that the distinction between abstract and concrete is a. relative one and applies not only to substantives, but to all other wordclasses as well. Hard is concrete in " a hard stone," but abstract in "hard work," towards in concrete in " he moved towards the town," but abstract in " his behaviour towards her," turn is concrete in "he turned round," but abstract in "he turned pale," etc. This usage, according to which " concrete" stands chiefly for what is found in the exterior world as something palpable, space-filling, perceptible to the senses, and " abstract" refers to something only found in the mind, evidently agrees with popular language, but it does not assist us in understanding what is peculiar to such words as " whiteness" in contradistinction to other substantives.