ABSTRACT
Six years after the August 2002 exposure of Iran’s uranium-enrichment and plutonium-production programmes prompted intense scrutiny, diplomatic enticements and financial coercion, the international community has failed to persuade Iran to stop work that will soon give it a latent nuclear-weapons capability. Although technical difficulties and limited components still may restrict the size and effectiveness of its programmes, Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium has become a fait accompli. Zero enrichment remains the goal of the major powers that have been engaged with Iran, although some, Russia and China in particular, realise it is no longer a credible objective. Recognising that an Iranian proliferation threat cannot be eliminated entirely, several private experts have suggested fallback options designed to minimise the proliferation risks. If Iran is to have a fissile-material-production capability regardless, it is clearly better for it to be limited in scale and transparent in operation. Positing a need for such limitations presupposes, however, that enrichment within set limitations is acceptable. Indeed, for Iran ever to accept limitations on its nuclear programme, the rest of the world would surely have to accept the legitimacy of Iran’s fuel-cycle facilities.
