ABSTRACT
This contribution assesses EU member state building in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by focusing specifically on the role of the EU in the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia. This chapter explores the extent to which BiH’s constitutional reform journey has been influenced by its stated goal of EU membership, and whether the EU accession process itself is an incentivizing force for reform. Evidence suggests that the EU enlargement process is not a tool that will resolve BiH’s core constitutional problems. While the Dayton Agreement did end the war, the Dayton Constitution has proved to be unworkable; in fact it has perhaps unwittingly left BiH as a sort of frozen conflict. Whether a new constitutional structure could help to “unfreeze” BiH remains unknown. However, by virtue of being the single largest player in BiH, the EU will have an impact on the success or failure of constitutional reform. By demonstrating the weaknesses of the EU in dealing with local elites in the process of constitutional reform, it is demonstrated that member state building in the case of Bosnia has had very little impact so far.
