ABSTRACT
The Unsettledness View sees indeterminacy entering the world at the level of what states of affairs obtain or fail to obtain. As a result, the believer in this view need have no disagreement with someone who refuses to countenance worldly indeterminacy as to what states of affairs might exist or the nature of these states of affairs. On the Third-Way View, as well as propositions making demands on the world for their truth, and for their falsity, propositions also make specific demands on the world for their indeterminacy. The defender of the Third-Way View is increasing the stock of possible states of affairs she countenances: she disagrees with the defender of the Unsettledness View and the epistemicist that the only states of affairs that might obtain are those of ordinary objects instantiating familiar properties and standing in familiar relations. Thus in the Unsettledness View, there are no indeterminate states of affairs.
