ABSTRACT
The contributions to this volume are compared and integrated. Donald R. Griffin outlines the main concerns of cognitive ethology. He suggests that animals might have simple thoughts about matters of consequence to them, and he explores some lines of evidence for the presence of consciousness and possible functions consciousness might serve. Colin Beer provides a summary of contemporary ideas in folk psychology and other views in the philosophy of mind as they bear upon the study of animal minds. The philosophical foundation of belief/desire concepts, one of various possible folk psychological approaches that can be applied to cognitive ethology, are examined by the philosopher Jonathan Bennett.
Misgivings about attempts to study consciousness are voiced by Yoerg and Kamil, who suggest that cognitive ethology look to cognitive psychology for useful concepts. Likewise, the developmental psychologist George Michel is concerned about using folk psychological concepts and cites difficulties from the field of developmental psychology with the use of such terms.
Other contributions note the rich research findings that have been developed through entertaining possibilities of consciousness or at least complex thinking by animals. Such approaches have led to the design of experiments not otherwise likely to have been undertaken. Alison Jolly reviews primate laboratory and field behavior that suggests consciousness, and Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth discuss possibly deceptive behavior of vervet monkeys and other animal species. I study, by means of field experiments, the injury-feigning behavior of plovers as well as other antipredator acts which suggest considerable cognitive ability. Gordon Burghardt examines the death feigning of hognose snakes in the laboratory. Both Ristau and Burghardt 292explore the advantages and disadvantages in applying an intentional stance (and belief/desire statements) in research on animal behavior.
Detailed aspects of animal cognition are discussed by several contributors. Irene Pepperberg cites the usefulness of a parrot's artificial communication system (the use of spoken English words) in revealing the parrot's cognitive abilities. Peter Marler, Marcel Gyger, and Stephen Karakashian describe their experiments which examine the effects of different audiences on the communication of chickens. This is a question of particular interest if one considers the possibility that animals may be intending to communicate as opposed merely to emitting vocalizations in the presence of certain classes of eliciting stimuli. Finally, W. J. Smith discusses the experiments by Marler and colleagues and examines, in more general terms, the messages and meanings of animal signals, the nature and limitation of playback experiments, and the conclusions to be drawn from such experiments.
The foremost conclusion to be drawn from the diversity of opinions is that the field of cognitive ethology, broadly construed, is a most exciting and important one. The present time is an era of pioneering studies and a time to encourage a diversity of approaches and integration with fields such as philosophy, child development, experimental and comparative psychology, and linguistics. Donald R. Griffin had a pioneering role and continues to have a most productive role in stimulating and provoking important scientific experimentation, analysis, and discussion.
