ABSTRACT
According to a standard objection, 1 Kant holds an unacceptably strict view on lying and deception, and an unreasonably demanding requirement of sincerity. Especially in his late essay ‘On a supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’, 2 Kant seems to endorse an unconditional prohibition against lying, even lying to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is pursuing has taken refuge in our house. 3 Yet, there are two limitations of this ‘unconditional’ prohibition which Kant asserts and which should make his view more palatable. First, the sincerity requirement is limited by the condition that the agent be forced to communicate. When the agent can refrain from communicating, there is no obligation to tell the truth. Second, the sincerity requirement is limited by the condition that the basic political structure of a state be not undermined. For agents who play a role in the political institutions of a state, not only can it be the case that there is no obligation to tell the truth, but there can be an obligation on their part to dissimulate, even when dissimulation implies intentional deceit.
