ABSTRACT
My concern in this chapter is the idea (and ideal) of sincerity within the so-called doctrine of public reason. Very roughly, the doctrine of public reason holds that the exercise of political power ought to be adequately justified to the addressees of the law, understood as free and equal, self-legislating moral persons. Now because the practice of public reason involves exchanging reasons for and against the exercise of political power, it seems uncontroversial that an adequate theory of public reason should to some extent be concerned with the way in which citizens deliberate. In particular, many think, it would be desirable if citizens committed to the ideal of public reason respected some sincerity requirement while discussing political issues with one another. After all, public reasoning aims at bona fide justification. Hence, the arguments citizens put forward in support of their political proposals should not lapse into rhetorical attempts at persuasion. In fact, as Rawls’s principle of legitimacy explains, “our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions are sufficient […] and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons” (Rawls 1997: 578, italics mine). Again, then, it seems obvious to assume that public reasoning should be wedded to some principle of sincerity, which has been explicitly defended, although in slightly different variants, by public reason liberals such as John Rawls (1997), Gerald Gaus (1996), Jonathan Quong (2011), Micah Schwartzman (2011), Gerald Postema (1995) and Thomas Nagel (2003).
