But of what direct military value would a to produce a weapon. In 1977 a ‘well informed’ nuclear capability be to South Africa? Against American Government official was quoted as what possible targets might it be used? Presum-saying that South Africa was within two to four ably, South Africa would not use it against years of producing a bomb.4 Similarly, a Stock-guerrillas, where standard counter-insurgency holm-based arms expert5 believes that South tactics, aided by electronic surveillance and Africa has the technical ability, and ‘probably similar devices, seem likely to be the most the fissile material, to produce sophisticated effective counters. The threat of a nuclear nuclear weapons quickly and can, to all intents weapon would be unlikely, in any case, to deter and purposes, be counted as a nuclear power. guerrillas, and its use would not constitute a South Africa’s nuclear chief has said that sufficiently telling addition to South Africa’s her programme would be peacefully imple-anti-insurgency arsenal to warrant the heavy mented until the Government ‘might decide political costs involved. Nor, for much the same otherwise’.6 Former Prime Minister Vorster reasons, would it make sense to threaten acknowledged in 1976 that South Africa could Luanda, Maputo or Lusaka with nuclear enrich uranium and had the capability to mount destruction. The only plausible use of a nuclear a nuclear defence.7 Thus South Africa, while deterrent by South Africa would be against consistently denying her intention of acquiring a the threat of conventional attack, which, the weapon, has done nothing to discourage other leadership appears to believe, would be most countries from believing that she has the likely to originate in Angola. The threat to use capacity to do so. tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional The question of Pretoria’s intentions suddenly cross-border assault from Angola would cer-became prominent in August 1977, when tainly present a formidable new deterrent. Soviet leaders informed the White House Yet there would be grave risks. A declared that their intelligence indicated South African or demonstrated nuclear capability would isolate preparations for an atomic explosion in the South Africa further from the Western demo-Kalahari Desert.8 The Soviet Union asked the cracies and from the rest of Africa. It would help of the United States – and, in the next also mean the loss of a major South African few days, that of Britain, France and West bargaining counter in future negotiations with Germany – to stop the test. A reconnaissance the West, particularly (but not solely) in the satellite sent up by the United States showed a important area of commercial nuclear exchanges. ‘cluster of sheds and other buildings around a The chances of achieving general and gradual prominent tower’, which American officials detente in southern Africa through Pretoria’s seemed reasonably certain was a test site. initiative would be all but finally foreclosed. The American and West European Governments Further polarization of the region would pro-warned Pretoria of the serious consequences of bably follow. A few of the smaller and more a test. The United States drafted a statement of dependent states might draw closer to the the assurances she sought from South Africa, South African security system, but countries and on 23 August President Carter announced like Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps that Mr Vorster had assured him that South Zambia) might then seek binding security Africa had no intention of developing nuclear guarantees from other nuclear powers (perhaps devices, that the Kalahari site was not for from the Soviet Union), thereby giving the USSR nuclear testing and that South Africa would the opportunity to acquire a cluster of military not test any nuclear explosive. dependencies in southern Africa. At the UNthe The site and its intended use have nevertheless pressure for complete and comprehensive sanc-remained a mystery. Had South Africa planned tions against South Africa would be virtually to test a weapon, and if so, why? President universal. Carter’s continuing suspicions of South African What hard evidence is there, then, of South intentions were revealed by his statement (made Africa’s nuclear capabilities and intentions? receiving Pretoria’s assurances) that the

doi:10.4324/9780203770313-52

Chapter

But of what direct military value would a to produce a weapon. In 1977 a ‘well informed’ nuclear capability be to South Africa? Against American Government official was quoted as what possible targets might it be used? Presum-saying that South Africa was within two to four ably, South Africa would not use it against years of producing a bomb.4 Similarly, a Stock-guerrillas, where standard counter-insurgency holm-based arms expert5 believes that South tactics, aided by electronic surveillance and Africa has the technical ability, and ‘probably similar devices, seem likely to be the most the fissile material, to produce sophisticated effective counters. The threat of a nuclear nuclear weapons quickly and can, to all intents weapon would be unlikely, in any case, to deter and purposes, be counted as a nuclear power. guerrillas, and its use would not constitute a South Africa’s nuclear chief has said that sufficiently telling addition to South Africa’s her programme would be peacefully imple-anti-insurgency arsenal to warrant the heavy mented until the Government ‘might decide political costs involved. Nor, for much the same otherwise’.6 Former Prime Minister Vorster reasons, would it make sense to threaten acknowledged in 1976 that South Africa could Luanda, Maputo or Lusaka with nuclear enrich uranium and had the capability to mount destruction. The only plausible use of a nuclear a nuclear defence.7 Thus South Africa, while deterrent by South Africa would be against consistently denying her intention of acquiring a the threat of conventional attack, which, the weapon, has done nothing to discourage other leadership appears to believe, would be most countries from believing that she has the likely to originate in Angola. The threat to use capacity to do so. tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional The question of Pretoria’s intentions suddenly cross-border assault from Angola would cer-became prominent in August 1977, when tainly present a formidable new deterrent. Soviet leaders informed the White House Yet there would be grave risks. A declared that their intelligence indicated South African or demonstrated nuclear capability would isolate preparations for an atomic explosion in the South Africa further from the Western demo-Kalahari Desert.8 The Soviet Union asked the cracies and from the rest of Africa. It would help of the United States – and, in the next also mean the loss of a major South African few days, that of Britain, France and West bargaining counter in future negotiations with Germany – to stop the test. A reconnaissance the West, particularly (but not solely) in the satellite sent up by the United States showed a important area of commercial nuclear exchanges. ‘cluster of sheds and other buildings around a The chances of achieving general and gradual prominent tower’, which American officials detente in southern Africa through Pretoria’s seemed reasonably certain was a test site. initiative would be all but finally foreclosed. The American and West European Governments Further polarization of the region would pro-warned Pretoria of the serious consequences of bably follow. A few of the smaller and more a test. The United States drafted a statement of dependent states might draw closer to the the assurances she sought from South Africa, South African security system, but countries and on 23 August President Carter announced like Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps that Mr Vorster had assured him that South Zambia) might then seek binding security Africa had no intention of developing nuclear guarantees from other nuclear powers (perhaps devices, that the Kalahari site was not for from the Soviet Union), thereby giving the USSR nuclear testing and that South Africa would the opportunity to acquire a cluster of military not test any nuclear explosive. dependencies in southern Africa. At the UNthe The site and its intended use have nevertheless pressure for complete and comprehensive sanc-remained a mystery. Had South Africa planned tions against South Africa would be virtually to test a weapon, and if so, why? President universal. Carter’s continuing suspicions of South African What hard evidence is there, then, of South intentions were revealed by his statement (made Africa’s nuclear capabilities and intentions? receiving Pretoria’s assurances) that the

Chapter

But of what direct military value would a to produce a weapon. In 1977 a ‘well informed’ nuclear capability be to South Africa? Against American Government official was quoted as what possible targets might it be used? Presum-saying that South Africa was within two to four ably, South Africa would not use it against years of producing a bomb.4 Similarly, a Stock-guerrillas, where standard counter-insurgency holm-based arms expert5 believes that South tactics, aided by electronic surveillance and Africa has the technical ability, and ‘probably similar devices, seem likely to be the most the fissile material, to produce sophisticated effective counters. The threat of a nuclear nuclear weapons quickly and can, to all intents weapon would be unlikely, in any case, to deter and purposes, be counted as a nuclear power. guerrillas, and its use would not constitute a South Africa’s nuclear chief has said that sufficiently telling addition to South Africa’s her programme would be peacefully imple-anti-insurgency arsenal to warrant the heavy mented until the Government ‘might decide political costs involved. Nor, for much the same otherwise’.6 Former Prime Minister Vorster reasons, would it make sense to threaten acknowledged in 1976 that South Africa could Luanda, Maputo or Lusaka with nuclear enrich uranium and had the capability to mount destruction. The only plausible use of a nuclear a nuclear defence.7 Thus South Africa, while deterrent by South Africa would be against consistently denying her intention of acquiring a the threat of conventional attack, which, the weapon, has done nothing to discourage other leadership appears to believe, would be most countries from believing that she has the likely to originate in Angola. The threat to use capacity to do so. tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional The question of Pretoria’s intentions suddenly cross-border assault from Angola would cer-became prominent in August 1977, when tainly present a formidable new deterrent. Soviet leaders informed the White House Yet there would be grave risks. A declared that their intelligence indicated South African or demonstrated nuclear capability would isolate preparations for an atomic explosion in the South Africa further from the Western demo-Kalahari Desert.8 The Soviet Union asked the cracies and from the rest of Africa. It would help of the United States – and, in the next also mean the loss of a major South African few days, that of Britain, France and West bargaining counter in future negotiations with Germany – to stop the test. A reconnaissance the West, particularly (but not solely) in the satellite sent up by the United States showed a important area of commercial nuclear exchanges. ‘cluster of sheds and other buildings around a The chances of achieving general and gradual prominent tower’, which American officials detente in southern Africa through Pretoria’s seemed reasonably certain was a test site. initiative would be all but finally foreclosed. The American and West European Governments Further polarization of the region would pro-warned Pretoria of the serious consequences of bably follow. A few of the smaller and more a test. The United States drafted a statement of dependent states might draw closer to the the assurances she sought from South Africa, South African security system, but countries and on 23 August President Carter announced like Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps that Mr Vorster had assured him that South Zambia) might then seek binding security Africa had no intention of developing nuclear guarantees from other nuclear powers (perhaps devices, that the Kalahari site was not for from the Soviet Union), thereby giving the USSR nuclear testing and that South Africa would the opportunity to acquire a cluster of military not test any nuclear explosive. dependencies in southern Africa. At the UNthe The site and its intended use have nevertheless pressure for complete and comprehensive sanc-remained a mystery. Had South Africa planned tions against South Africa would be virtually to test a weapon, and if so, why? President universal. Carter’s continuing suspicions of South African What hard evidence is there, then, of South intentions were revealed by his statement (made Africa’s nuclear capabilities and intentions? receiving Pretoria’s assurances) that the

DOI link for But of what direct military value would a to produce a weapon. In 1977 a ‘well informed’ nuclear capability be to South Africa? Against American Government official was quoted as what possible targets might it be used? Presum-saying that South Africa was within two to four ably, South Africa would not use it against years of producing a bomb.4 Similarly, a Stock-guerrillas, where standard counter-insurgency holm-based arms expert5 believes that South tactics, aided by electronic surveillance and Africa has the technical ability, and ‘probably similar devices, seem likely to be the most the fissile material, to produce sophisticated effective counters. The threat of a nuclear nuclear weapons quickly and can, to all intents weapon would be unlikely, in any case, to deter and purposes, be counted as a nuclear power. guerrillas, and its use would not constitute a South Africa’s nuclear chief has said that sufficiently telling addition to South Africa’s her programme would be peacefully imple-anti-insurgency arsenal to warrant the heavy mented until the Government ‘might decide political costs involved. Nor, for much the same otherwise’.6 Former Prime Minister Vorster reasons, would it make sense to threaten acknowledged in 1976 that South Africa could Luanda, Maputo or Lusaka with nuclear enrich uranium and had the capability to mount destruction. The only plausible use of a nuclear a nuclear defence.7 Thus South Africa, while deterrent by South Africa would be against consistently denying her intention of acquiring a the threat of conventional attack, which, the weapon, has done nothing to discourage other leadership appears to believe, would be most countries from believing that she has the likely to originate in Angola. The threat to use capacity to do so. tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional The question of Pretoria’s intentions suddenly cross-border assault from Angola would cer-became prominent in August 1977, when tainly present a formidable new deterrent. Soviet leaders informed the White House Yet there would be grave risks. A declared that their intelligence indicated South African or demonstrated nuclear capability would isolate preparations for an atomic explosion in the South Africa further from the Western demo-Kalahari Desert.8 The Soviet Union asked the cracies and from the rest of Africa. It would help of the United States – and, in the next also mean the loss of a major South African few days, that of Britain, France and West bargaining counter in future negotiations with Germany – to stop the test. A reconnaissance the West, particularly (but not solely) in the satellite sent up by the United States showed a important area of commercial nuclear exchanges. ‘cluster of sheds and other buildings around a The chances of achieving general and gradual prominent tower’, which American officials detente in southern Africa through Pretoria’s seemed reasonably certain was a test site. initiative would be all but finally foreclosed. The American and West European Governments Further polarization of the region would pro-warned Pretoria of the serious consequences of bably follow. A few of the smaller and more a test. The United States drafted a statement of dependent states might draw closer to the the assurances she sought from South Africa, South African security system, but countries and on 23 August President Carter announced like Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps that Mr Vorster had assured him that South Zambia) might then seek binding security Africa had no intention of developing nuclear guarantees from other nuclear powers (perhaps devices, that the Kalahari site was not for from the Soviet Union), thereby giving the USSR nuclear testing and that South Africa would the opportunity to acquire a cluster of military not test any nuclear explosive. dependencies in southern Africa. At the UNthe The site and its intended use have nevertheless pressure for complete and comprehensive sanc-remained a mystery. Had South Africa planned tions against South Africa would be virtually to test a weapon, and if so, why? President universal. Carter’s continuing suspicions of South African What hard evidence is there, then, of South intentions were revealed by his statement (made Africa’s nuclear capabilities and intentions? receiving Pretoria’s assurances) that the

But of what direct military value would a to produce a weapon. In 1977 a ‘well informed’ nuclear capability be to South Africa? Against American Government official was quoted as what possible targets might it be used? Presum-saying that South Africa was within two to four ably, South Africa would not use it against years of producing a bomb.4 Similarly, a Stock-guerrillas, where standard counter-insurgency holm-based arms expert5 believes that South tactics, aided by electronic surveillance and Africa has the technical ability, and ‘probably similar devices, seem likely to be the most the fissile material, to produce sophisticated effective counters. The threat of a nuclear nuclear weapons quickly and can, to all intents weapon would be unlikely, in any case, to deter and purposes, be counted as a nuclear power. guerrillas, and its use would not constitute a South Africa’s nuclear chief has said that sufficiently telling addition to South Africa’s her programme would be peacefully imple-anti-insurgency arsenal to warrant the heavy mented until the Government ‘might decide political costs involved. Nor, for much the same otherwise’.6 Former Prime Minister Vorster reasons, would it make sense to threaten acknowledged in 1976 that South Africa could Luanda, Maputo or Lusaka with nuclear enrich uranium and had the capability to mount destruction. The only plausible use of a nuclear a nuclear defence.7 Thus South Africa, while deterrent by South Africa would be against consistently denying her intention of acquiring a the threat of conventional attack, which, the weapon, has done nothing to discourage other leadership appears to believe, would be most countries from believing that she has the likely to originate in Angola. The threat to use capacity to do so. tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional The question of Pretoria’s intentions suddenly cross-border assault from Angola would cer-became prominent in August 1977, when tainly present a formidable new deterrent. Soviet leaders informed the White House Yet there would be grave risks. A declared that their intelligence indicated South African or demonstrated nuclear capability would isolate preparations for an atomic explosion in the South Africa further from the Western demo-Kalahari Desert.8 The Soviet Union asked the cracies and from the rest of Africa. It would help of the United States – and, in the next also mean the loss of a major South African few days, that of Britain, France and West bargaining counter in future negotiations with Germany – to stop the test. A reconnaissance the West, particularly (but not solely) in the satellite sent up by the United States showed a important area of commercial nuclear exchanges. ‘cluster of sheds and other buildings around a The chances of achieving general and gradual prominent tower’, which American officials detente in southern Africa through Pretoria’s seemed reasonably certain was a test site. initiative would be all but finally foreclosed. The American and West European Governments Further polarization of the region would pro-warned Pretoria of the serious consequences of bably follow. A few of the smaller and more a test. The United States drafted a statement of dependent states might draw closer to the the assurances she sought from South Africa, South African security system, but countries and on 23 August President Carter announced like Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps that Mr Vorster had assured him that South Zambia) might then seek binding security Africa had no intention of developing nuclear guarantees from other nuclear powers (perhaps devices, that the Kalahari site was not for from the Soviet Union), thereby giving the USSR nuclear testing and that South Africa would the opportunity to acquire a cluster of military not test any nuclear explosive. dependencies in southern Africa. At the UNthe The site and its intended use have nevertheless pressure for complete and comprehensive sanc-remained a mystery. Had South Africa planned tions against South Africa would be virtually to test a weapon, and if so, why? President universal. Carter’s continuing suspicions of South African What hard evidence is there, then, of South intentions were revealed by his statement (made Africa’s nuclear capabilities and intentions? receiving Pretoria’s assurances) that the

ABSTRACT

But of what direct military value would a nuclear capability be to South Africa? Against what possible targets might it be used? Presumably, South Africa would not use it against guerrillas, where standard counter-insurgency tactics, aided by electronic surveillance and similar devices, seem likely to be the most effective counters. The threat of a nuclear weapon would be unlikely, in any case, to deter guerrillas, and its use would not constitute a sufficiently telling addition to South Africa’s anti-insurgency arsenal to warrant the heavy political costs involved. Nor, for much the same reasons, would it make sense to threaten Luanda, Maputo or Lusaka with nuclear destruction. The only plausible use of a nuclear deterrent by South Africa would be against the threat of conventional attack, which, the leadership appears to believe, would be most likely to originate in Angola. The threat to use tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional cross-border assault from Angola would certainly present a formidable new deterrent.