bouring territories, within South Africa proper. against Angola or Zambia as a means to Most critical is the probability that South Africa dampen SWAPOaggression. In the fragile and already has a nuclear weapon or will have one volatile southern African environment, a mis-within the next couple of years. When taken guided or unexpected act of aggression by together, these three factors suggest the strong Pretora could have serious consequences for possibility that South Africa might, at some the West, for clearly the Soviet Union and point, detonate a nuclear device if she has not Cuba, in order to maintain credibility among the already done so, and might subsequently national liberation groups and their African threaten to deploy nuclear weapons against sponsors, would have to respond convincingly nearby states. to a South African military challenge. This study of South Africa’s security strategy For the West, then, South Africa will almost offers no policy prescriptions for the West, but certainly pose serious and growing problems in it does point to some problems as well as oppor-the next ten years. The realities of domestic tunities which South Africa may present during politics and bureaucratic inertia in South Africa the coming decade. This is the more important will continue to inhibit the Government from since South Africa will be a major actor in the moving far enough or fast enough on race policy tragic drama now unfolding in southern Africa. to put a stop to the rising tide of global hostility South Africa’s bid to assume a guiding and belligerence directed at the white minority. role in the fragile situation in Namibia and in Other states will therefore find it more difficult, the Rhodesian crisis came at a time when her in terms of both their own domestic and foreign leaders were internationally more isolated than politics, to conduct official relations of any sort ever before, as well as being constrained by with South Africa. Since neither the West nor domestic politics to adopt a defiant, uncom-Pretoria can risk making the sort of concession promising posture towards the West. The needed to bring the other to change its basic Government’s strong backing of the conservative policies, the West is likely to lose what little in-internal parties in both territories made it fluence it had in the past over South Africa’s difficult for the Western powers to influence such leaders. In its relations with Pretoria the West groups or to regain the initiative in the search will face the problem of dealing with a cornered for a peaceful settlement. South African support wild-cat small but potentially lethal, un-

DOI link for bouring territories, within South Africa proper. against Angola or Zambia as a means to Most critical is the probability that South Africa dampen SWAPOaggression. In the fragile and already has a nuclear weapon or will have one volatile southern African environment, a mis-within the next couple of years. When taken guided or unexpected act of aggression by together, these three factors suggest the strong Pretora could have serious consequences for possibility that South Africa might, at some the West, for clearly the Soviet Union and point, detonate a nuclear device if she has not Cuba, in order to maintain credibility among the already done so, and might subsequently national liberation groups and their African threaten to deploy nuclear weapons against sponsors, would have to respond convincingly nearby states. to a South African military challenge. This study of South Africa’s security strategy For the West, then, South Africa will almost offers no policy prescriptions for the West, but certainly pose serious and growing problems in it does point to some problems as well as oppor-the next ten years. The realities of domestic tunities which South Africa may present during politics and bureaucratic inertia in South Africa the coming decade. This is the more important will continue to inhibit the Government from since South Africa will be a major actor in the moving far enough or fast enough on race policy tragic drama now unfolding in southern Africa. to put a stop to the rising tide of global hostility South Africa’s bid to assume a guiding and belligerence directed at the white minority. role in the fragile situation in Namibia and in Other states will therefore find it more difficult, the Rhodesian crisis came at a time when her in terms of both their own domestic and foreign leaders were internationally more isolated than politics, to conduct official relations of any sort ever before, as well as being constrained by with South Africa. Since neither the West nor domestic politics to adopt a defiant, uncom-Pretoria can risk making the sort of concession promising posture towards the West. The needed to bring the other to change its basic Government’s strong backing of the conservative policies, the West is likely to lose what little in-internal parties in both territories made it fluence it had in the past over South Africa’s difficult for the Western powers to influence such leaders. In its relations with Pretoria the West groups or to regain the initiative in the search will face the problem of dealing with a cornered for a peaceful settlement. South African support wild-cat small but potentially lethal, un-

bouring territories, within South Africa proper. against Angola or Zambia as a means to Most critical is the probability that South Africa dampen SWAPOaggression. In the fragile and already has a nuclear weapon or will have one volatile southern African environment, a mis-within the next couple of years. When taken guided or unexpected act of aggression by together, these three factors suggest the strong Pretora could have serious consequences for possibility that South Africa might, at some the West, for clearly the Soviet Union and point, detonate a nuclear device if she has not Cuba, in order to maintain credibility among the already done so, and might subsequently national liberation groups and their African threaten to deploy nuclear weapons against sponsors, would have to respond convincingly nearby states. to a South African military challenge. This study of South Africa’s security strategy For the West, then, South Africa will almost offers no policy prescriptions for the West, but certainly pose serious and growing problems in it does point to some problems as well as oppor-the next ten years. The realities of domestic tunities which South Africa may present during politics and bureaucratic inertia in South Africa the coming decade. This is the more important will continue to inhibit the Government from since South Africa will be a major actor in the moving far enough or fast enough on race policy tragic drama now unfolding in southern Africa. to put a stop to the rising tide of global hostility South Africa’s bid to assume a guiding and belligerence directed at the white minority. role in the fragile situation in Namibia and in Other states will therefore find it more difficult, the Rhodesian crisis came at a time when her in terms of both their own domestic and foreign leaders were internationally more isolated than politics, to conduct official relations of any sort ever before, as well as being constrained by with South Africa. Since neither the West nor domestic politics to adopt a defiant, uncom-Pretoria can risk making the sort of concession promising posture towards the West. The needed to bring the other to change its basic Government’s strong backing of the conservative policies, the West is likely to lose what little in-internal parties in both territories made it fluence it had in the past over South Africa’s difficult for the Western powers to influence such leaders. In its relations with Pretoria the West groups or to regain the initiative in the search will face the problem of dealing with a cornered for a peaceful settlement. South African support wild-cat small but potentially lethal, un-