Rhodesia had agreed on the terms of an that of Zambia) was suffering from the internal settlement. closure of her own important rail links to The limits of Front-Line influence over the Rhodesia, was so angry that he condemned PFat that time were demonstrated when Kaunda’s move in the press. He also refused Secretaries Vance and Owen themselves went to attend the next Front-Line summit at Dar to Maputo in April 1978 to negotiate with es-Salaam, called by Kaunda to express dis-the two PFleaders. They went only after pleasure at his fellow Presidents’ criticism. At being assured by the Front-Line leaders that Dar es-Salaam the rancour in the air was Nkomo and Mugabe were ready to accept the such that no real dialogue took place, but, by Anglo-US proposals. In Maputo, however, it the next summit in March 1979, the incident quickly became apparent that the two PF had been buried and no hard feelings were leaders remained adamantly opposed to key apparent.7 parts of the proposals, including broad Frictions such as this were but one feature powers for a British Resident Commissioner of Front-Line collaboration in its initial and an effective monitoring role for the UN. period. They should be seen in the broad per-Meanwhile, as the fighting intensified, a spective of a group of new, politically diverse number of sharp disagreements had arisen and economically weak states jointly pursu-among the Front-Line leaders. Nyerere was ing a difficult foreign policy objective under a ‘furious’ on learning in late that Neto growing threat to their countries’ political and Kaunda had been secretly training and economic stability. Moreover, much of Nkomo’s guerrillas, in breach of a Front-Line the friction reflected differences in personal-agreement that both ZANUand ZAPUfighters ity and style, and differing degrees of mili-would be trained jointly at Tanzania’s Nach-tancy among the Front-Line Presidents. In a ingwea base.6 Nyerere also sharply chal-process particularly marked by ad hoc sum-lenged a proposal by Kaunda to drop the idea mitry, the interplay among the leaders’ per-of elections in favour of a government of sonalities had a decisive impact on their national unity. state-to-state relations. No attempts were The most serious rupture occurred in early made to discourage an individual Front-Line when Zambia announced the re-President from undertaking unilateral, often

DOI link for Rhodesia had agreed on the terms of an that of Zambia) was suffering from the internal settlement. closure of her own important rail links to The limits of Front-Line influence over the Rhodesia, was so angry that he condemned PFat that time were demonstrated when Kaunda’s move in the press. He also refused Secretaries Vance and Owen themselves went to attend the next Front-Line summit at Dar to Maputo in April 1978 to negotiate with es-Salaam, called by Kaunda to express dis-the two PFleaders. They went only after pleasure at his fellow Presidents’ criticism. At being assured by the Front-Line leaders that Dar es-Salaam the rancour in the air was Nkomo and Mugabe were ready to accept the such that no real dialogue took place, but, by Anglo-US proposals. In Maputo, however, it the next summit in March 1979, the incident quickly became apparent that the two PF had been buried and no hard feelings were leaders remained adamantly opposed to key apparent.7 parts of the proposals, including broad Frictions such as this were but one feature powers for a British Resident Commissioner of Front-Line collaboration in its initial and an effective monitoring role for the UN. period. They should be seen in the broad per-Meanwhile, as the fighting intensified, a spective of a group of new, politically diverse number of sharp disagreements had arisen and economically weak states jointly pursu-among the Front-Line leaders. Nyerere was ing a difficult foreign policy objective under a ‘furious’ on learning in late that Neto growing threat to their countries’ political and Kaunda had been secretly training and economic stability. Moreover, much of Nkomo’s guerrillas, in breach of a Front-Line the friction reflected differences in personal-agreement that both ZANUand ZAPUfighters ity and style, and differing degrees of mili-would be trained jointly at Tanzania’s Nach-tancy among the Front-Line Presidents. In a ingwea base.6 Nyerere also sharply chal-process particularly marked by ad hoc sum-lenged a proposal by Kaunda to drop the idea mitry, the interplay among the leaders’ per-of elections in favour of a government of sonalities had a decisive impact on their national unity. state-to-state relations. No attempts were The most serious rupture occurred in early made to discourage an individual Front-Line when Zambia announced the re-President from undertaking unilateral, often

Rhodesia had agreed on the terms of an that of Zambia) was suffering from the internal settlement. closure of her own important rail links to The limits of Front-Line influence over the Rhodesia, was so angry that he condemned PFat that time were demonstrated when Kaunda’s move in the press. He also refused Secretaries Vance and Owen themselves went to attend the next Front-Line summit at Dar to Maputo in April 1978 to negotiate with es-Salaam, called by Kaunda to express dis-the two PFleaders. They went only after pleasure at his fellow Presidents’ criticism. At being assured by the Front-Line leaders that Dar es-Salaam the rancour in the air was Nkomo and Mugabe were ready to accept the such that no real dialogue took place, but, by Anglo-US proposals. In Maputo, however, it the next summit in March 1979, the incident quickly became apparent that the two PF had been buried and no hard feelings were leaders remained adamantly opposed to key apparent.7 parts of the proposals, including broad Frictions such as this were but one feature powers for a British Resident Commissioner of Front-Line collaboration in its initial and an effective monitoring role for the UN. period. They should be seen in the broad per-Meanwhile, as the fighting intensified, a spective of a group of new, politically diverse number of sharp disagreements had arisen and economically weak states jointly pursu-among the Front-Line leaders. Nyerere was ing a difficult foreign policy objective under a ‘furious’ on learning in late that Neto growing threat to their countries’ political and Kaunda had been secretly training and economic stability. Moreover, much of Nkomo’s guerrillas, in breach of a Front-Line the friction reflected differences in personal-agreement that both ZANUand ZAPUfighters ity and style, and differing degrees of mili-would be trained jointly at Tanzania’s Nach-tancy among the Front-Line Presidents. In a ingwea base.6 Nyerere also sharply chal-process particularly marked by ad hoc sum-lenged a proposal by Kaunda to drop the idea mitry, the interplay among the leaders’ per-of elections in favour of a government of sonalities had a decisive impact on their national unity. state-to-state relations. No attempts were The most serious rupture occurred in early made to discourage an individual Front-Line when Zambia announced the re-President from undertaking unilateral, often