ABSTRACT
The main thesis of this chapter is that one of the most puzzling aspects of consciousness can be explained by considering an important limitation of connectionist networks. The puzzle concerns the number of things of which we can be simultaneously aware. In some sense, we are only aware of a single Gestalt at a time. In visual perception, if we attend to one object, we cannot simultaneously attend to other objects. In language understanding, when we comprehend one proposition, we do not simultaneously comprehend other propositions. When solving a complex problem, if we focus on one subtask we cannot simultaneously focus on other subtasks. The puzzle arises because our awareness of a Gestalt presumably involves information about the relationships among the constituents of the Gestalt, so despite the phenomenological evidence for the unity and exclusiveness of consciousness, reason tells us that we must be actively representing several of the constituents of our current Gestalt. So why are we not conscious of those constituents? This puzzle is particularly acute for spotlight theories of attention, because, if an object is under the spotlight, then so are its parts.
