ABSTRACT
In some remote causal way, I am writing this piece as a result of the fact that my ftrst serious introduction to the psychology of emotion was George Mandler's book Mind and Emotion (Mandler, 1975). My initial reaction upon reading it was, I recall, rather mixed. I felt it was interesting and largely believable, but I also found it frustrating and incomplete. I began corresponding with George on a number of issues raised by Mind and Emotion, and soon, with considerable encouragement from him, I got going on the study of emotion. I started doing what George felt somebody, but not he, should be doing, namely, I started thinking about the cognitive antecedents of the different emotions. My colleagues and I worked on this problem for nearly ten years, ftnally publishing our efforts in a book entitled The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). One of the main themes of that work was the idea that there are three classes of emotions. This ftrst class consists of emotions resulting from appraisals rooted in goals, the second from appraisals rooted in standards and norms, and the third from appraisals grounded in tastes and attitudes.
