ABSTRACT

While the ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan remains controversial, the US-led assault in 2001 had the imprimatur of the United Nations. The same could not be said for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Frustrated by Saddam Hussein’s continued defiance of United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States effectively bypassed the United Nations Security Council and decided to invade on the basis that the Iraqi regime represented a clear and present danger. It stood accused of supporting the Al-Qaeda network and stockpiling illegal supplies of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With the support of a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, the Americans and their allies overthrew the regime and captured Saddam Hussein, but failed to find any evidence of WMD. Four years on from the invasion (at the time of writing, 2007), it was increasingly clear that the Bush administration had been determined to pursue this regime regardless of any clear evidence of linkage to September 11th and/or WMD capacity. As a consequence, and in the face of continued high losses of civilian life in Iraq, through coalition bombing or suicide attacks by antiAmerican forces, the US occupation of Iraq had been accused of energizing still further radical Islamic militancy. This is a view that has been expressed by antiwar critics in North America and Europe, and within the Islamic community (umma) more generally.